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Th is lecture is divided into three main sections. Th e fi rst part discusses the von 
Uexküllian umwelt and Funktionskreis; the second concerns Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
semiotic, and the growth of signs and meanings; and the last explores the biosemiotic 
idea of poiesis – particularly in relation to culture and literature. Th e fi rst two sections 
will look at some of the main theoretical ideas underpinning biosemiotics. Th e third, 
taking particular account of this audience of members of the European Association 
for the Study of Literature, Culture and the Environment, will make some suggestions, 
with examples, of the ways we might think biosemiotically about the makings and 
self-makings which art, and especially literature, aff ords. 
1. The von Uexküllian umwelt and Funktionskreis
When we talk about framing nature, we must of course ask who, or what, is doing 
the framing. Are we framing nature? Or is nature, perhaps, framing us? And if the 
latter is the case, which aspect of nature might be doing the framing? Or should 
we perhaps be talking about a mutual framing, an on-going and growing dance of 
complexity in which the frames are, themselves, made of a constantly shift ing series 
of focuses and a growing evolutionary frame? Can we think of this dance of shift -
ing focuses like movements of attention: periods of dreamlike habit punctuated 
with intense experience of diff erences developing at diff erent levels and in diff erent 
places? Perhaps we can think of this as, for example, like a fi lm or video camera’s 
shift s from interior intimacy to exterior distance, from wide panning shot to tight 
close-up. What I mean to convey is a cybersemiotic dance of all the organisms in 
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which framing, itself, is a matter of perspective and subject-position. Th is is framing 
as autopoiesis and, more specifi cally, evolutionary life as a self-reading text in which 
meanings are constantly growing.
I am very honoured indeed to have been asked to give the fi rst annual Jakob 
von Uexküll Lecture here at the University of Tartu, for so long a centre of dynamic 
thinking and scholarship in semiotics, and I shall attempt to answer these questions 
from a biosemiotic point of view. So I start with von Uexküll, and, in particular, with 
two of his most signifi cant contributions to the fi elds of philosophy, theoretical biol-
ogy, and biosemiotics especially.
Th e fi rst of these contributions is the Uexküllian conception of umwelt. I know 
some of you will know about this, but some won’t, and especially because this lec-
ture honours his great infl uence upon our biosemiotic understandings, I thought it 
would be helpful to go into a little detail. In von Uexküll’s usage, umwelt does not 
mean simply ‘environment’ or ‘surround’ in a general sense, but, rather, ‘signifying 
environment’. In other words, each organism inhabits a species-specifi c semiotic 
world. As is well known, one of the simplest worlds invoked by von Uexküll is the 
umwelt of a species of tick. Th is animal has a semiotic world comprised of three 
signs only: the fi rst is the odour of the butyric acid which is produced by all mam-
mals, and which, when smelt, causes the tick to let go of the plant where it waits; the 
second is the blood temperature of mammals, indicating a successful landing; and 
the third is the hairy mammalian skin which causes the tick to burrow downwards 
in order to sink her thirsty head into the subcutaneous tissue of the “lucky” prey in 
preparation for reproduction.
Every species sees, or otherwise senses, only the signifying world which con-
stitutes its own species-specifi c carriers of meaning, or signs. Th is includes human 
animals of course, although here we will need to add further, much more complex, 
levels of semiosis. In the case of umwelten, the framer is evolution. Every species 
‘sees’, or otherwise senses, what evolutionary pressures have sculpted it to ‘see’, or 
otherwise sense, in terms of survival and reproduction. But in naming the fram-
ing force evolution, I am not by any means invoking either a simple neo-Darwin-
ian story of random genetic mutation and natural selection, or, indeed, a passive 
organism. Natural selection must always be a sculpting force of some signifi cance, 
although quite a few biologists have questioned the full extent of its role in evolu-
tionary change. Natural selection can sculpt or refi ne existing forms, but it cannot 
explain big speciation diff erences. 
When we come to highly complex things such as cultures, the questions sur-
rounding the applicability of Spencer’s, and then Darwin’s, idea of the production of 
the ‘fi ttest’, meaning the best fi tted to the environment, become much more diffi  cult. 
Should such a thing as ‘cultural selection’ exist, it might be to do with a ‘fi t’ in terms 
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of dominant fashions in ideas and groups, but here we enter the realms of philoso-
phy and sociology of religion and science, of Kuhnian paradigms, and of shift s in 
knowledge, and also of a general logic of development and growth. Th is, indeed, is 
Peircean territory of the logics of change. Th is question of the logics of change will 
take Peirce and us to both biological and cultural evolution. It will take us to natu-
ral and cultural stories, to the organism as processual semiotic structuration of hab-
its and diff erences, to the organism as made up of sign relations, and to the natural 
metaphors and metonymies before it takes us to cultural ones. 
But before moving on to that, I want to pause a moment to notice the changes 
that are going on in biology these days. Th e life sciences are certainly slowly mov-
ing on from the Modern Darwinian Synthesis (sometimes also called the neo-Dar-
winian synthesis) associated with Julian Huxley, Th eodosius Dobzhansky, J. B. S. 
Haldane, Ernst Mayr and so on. Th e growth of Developmental Systems Th eory, in 
particular, has meant that biologists are much more likely now to talk about meta-
phors and stories than they were 10 or 15 years ago. Kalevi Kull has noted the ways 
in which the grip of the Modern Synthesis has dug a vast trench between humani-
ties’ interests in language, semiosis and meaning-making, and similar interests in 
the life sciences. In his Foreword to the recent English translation of Patrick Sériot’s 
book Structure and the Whole: East, West and Non-Darwinian Biology in the Origins 
of Structural Linguistics, a book, incidentally, which demonstrates a long history of 
the intertwining of linguistics, geography, and biology, Kalevi Kull (2014: xi) writes,
Th e Modern Synthesis in […] biology during the 1930s made from a set of 
Darwinian ideas an extraordinarily strong dominant and it dug a trench between 
philology in the humanities and the study of other living and meaning-making 
creatures that was almost insurmountably wide. It temporarily killed the idea of 
intentionality in life sciences; it almost excluded the idea of convergence.
Baer, Berg and their followers developed a sound non-Darwinian approach to 
the explanation of the means and forms of evolution. According to this approach, 
development explains evolution, and not vice versa. Remarkably, the principles 
and means of this approach could be formulated in Jakobson’s hands as structural-
ism. Jakobson introduced this term into linguistics.
One has seen this gesture before. Darwin’s development of the branching structure 
of evolution was infl uenced by his cousin Hensleigh Wedgwood’s study of the evolu-
tion of languages. Roman Jakobson’s importation, via Claude Lévi-Strauss, of Prague 
School thinking into French intellectual life, as structuralism, could not take either 
the wider semiotic or wider and deeper biological dimensions across the East/West 
border. Th e neo-Darwinian Synthesis was already established in Western thought 
more broadly, and French semiology was already closely wedded to Saussure’s dyadic 
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and anthropocentric semiological theory. Although Jakobson was infl uenced by 
Charles Sanders Peirce, as well as by Saussurean linguistics, both anthropological 
structuralism, and its theoretical appearance in other humanities disciplines, was 
not. Nonetheless, research in epigenetics, the activity of prions in protein folding, 
and other non-genocentric mechanisms means that it is becoming increasingly clear 
that DNA is not the only means of heritable change. Not only are epigenetic behav-
iours a source of evolution, but also, in a surprising rebirth of a form of Lamarckism, 
it appears that environmentally acquired traits, such as reactions to stress, can be 
heritable too. 
To return, now, more directly to von Uexküll, the organism is not passive in 
evolutionary terms. Just as we, in our very complicated human ways, shape our 
environment, so, too, do all other organisms. It is here that we can introduce von 
Uexküll’s second important contribution to biosemiotic thinking. Th is is the notion 
of the Funktionskreis or functional circle. Making von Uexküll a very early proto-
cybernetician, the Funktionskreis describes the way in which signs from the umwelt 
enter the Innenwelt, or inner world, of the organism and thus change the organ-
ism’s behaviour. I would say that they activate the organism’s interpretive capacities, 
its mind. But, when I say this, please remember that we are always having to use 
words designed for the human versions of these phenomena. However, this might 
make us want to rethink what we mean when we use words such as ‘mind’ and 
‘interpretation’. 
At any rate, we can notice that signs fl ows inwards, round and about the organ-
ismic innenwelt systems, and, there transformed by interpretations and translations, 
fl ow outwards again as other signs. Does this require consciousness? No. Humans 
are the only animals that are deeply self-refl ective and conscious of the fact that they 
use signs. Th e eff ects of these changed signs – sign relations interpreted and trans-
formed – are felt, and in their turn translated, in the umwelten and Innenwelten of 
many other living things. Every creature, no matter how simple, must have a sense 
of ‘aboutness’ or intentionality; organisms have meanings and purposes and aims. 
However system-derived and non-conscious, they are not machines, and every liv-
ing thing must be capable of negotiating a sometimes surprising world. Th is means 
that every organism has something like ‘mind’. Mind does not require consciousness; 
most of your mind and my mind, and certainly the most creative parts, are non-
conscious – as research on creativity shows. Consciousness, well, human conscious-
ness at any rate, is extremely focused and thus limited – like a very bright spotlight. 
Again, what all this means is that we are required to stretch our language and thus to 
stretch our concepts. 
We can also notice that, when signs enter an organism’s Innenwelt, they enter a 
space in which, even from the start, it makes little sense to talk about body and mind 
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as though these were two distinct things. A mind is the sense which an organism 
makes of the relations between itself and its umwelt. As Gregory Bateson pointed 
out, mind is a ‘no-thing’ (Bateson 2002: 10). It is relational and immaterial. Mind is 
a sign of the activity of sign relations. Th us, instead of talking about mind and body 
as two distinct things, it will make much more sense to us to talk about a place of 
cybersemiotic feedback loopings, a constant circulation of semiosic processes, which 
also result in other signs fl owing back out into the environment again. Th us are ecol-
ogies and worlds made, and made of the ceaseless cybernetic looping fl ows of semio-
sis. And with this in mind, it’s worth noting that what DNA encodes is not a detailed 
assembly plan but is also a set of signs or cues whose reading by the cell depends 
upon the successful achievement of sense-making at each antecedent stage. In this 
you will surely recognize the germ of our own human practice of reading, word by 
word, sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph, chapter by chapter, building up 
meaning as we go. In other words, meanings biological and cultural grow. Th e story 
is the thread through which we can trace all those transformations and growing. 
So we have the notions of Funktionskreis and umwelt, but why does von Uexküll, 
and separately Charles Sanders Peirce, the other major theoretical resource for bio-
semiotics, want to talk about signs rather than simply about a direct and unmedi-
ated perception of the material world? Firstly, with von Uexküll, the insight that all 
organisms are oblivious to things which don’t matter to them in terms of their sur-
vival and reproduction, that the umwelt is a signifying world, must imply that, for 
any species, there are many, many aspects of the environment in general, as opposed 
to the umwelt of a species, which have no meaning-carrying capacity at all. For 
any species, this means that reality as such does not ‘get through’. Th ere is no view 
from nowhere as Th omas Nagel memorably put it. What ‘gets through’, and is real 
and causally effi  cacious, is organized into a coherent view, a model or map, and that 
means that we must distinguish between all that is, and what we know about, our 
map. But, as Alfred Korzybski said, we mustn’t go mistaking the map for the terri-
tory. What we know about is the organized web of semiosis; those things which can 
be, for any species, bearers of the signs of their world. Th ese are the things which 
make a mark on an organism’s way of getting about in the world.
2. Charles Sanders Peirce: 
The growth of signs and meanings 
Semiotic matters are more extensively developed into a system by Charles Sanders 
Peirce. Not only does he pick up a semiotic way of thinking which had lain more 
or less dormant between the end of the Middle Ages and the second half of the 
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nineteenth century when Peirce revived it, but he also developed an evolutionary 
semiotic whose movement through time  – as a triadic series of relations forming 
what Th omas Sebeok named as the ‘semiotic spiral’ – bears some similarities with 
both von Uexküll’s Funktionskreis and with the later ideas of cyberneticians such as 
Gregory Bateson. 
Peirce’s understanding of the sign involved a triadic structure – more accurately 
a triadic structuration of evolving sign relations – formed by an object, a representa-
men and an interpretant. Th e object, whether thing or idea, is never fully known, not 
least because it exists in a world of incalculable relations (Whitehead); the represen-
tamen is the sign vehicle, the object as it is known to any individual organism; and 
the interpretant, not simply the human ‘interpretation’, but the meaning (or func-
tion) for every organism, is the diff erence (or change) brought about by the sign rela-
tion as a whole. Th is is a mobile, processual, understanding of the sign; any of the 
three aspects is capable of occupying any of the three positions, and it is from this 
process that new learning, development and evolutionary growth can occur. Note 
that the outcome can be, and usually is, governed by habit. A habit is something like 
a dead metaphor: a diff erence which no longer signifi es in its fullness. It is, so to 
speak, a change or diff erence which doesn’t make much diff erence. But, clearly, life 
and communication depends upon regularities or habits. It’s when the change or dif-
ference occurs which does make a real diff erence that we have real growth. Th is kind 
of diff erence is the result of something like a living metaphor in which the framing 
suppositions of the representamen are seen to be similar to another diff erent frame 
entirely. Th is collision, or perhaps blending, of diff erent frames leads to an interpre-
tant which is a diff erence which really does make a diff erence (Bateson 1972). Such 
a diff erence, dependent on the kind of logic of chance and guessing which Peirce 
called abduction, provides the potential for real growth.
But what I want to notice especially about the semiotic emphasis is as follows: 
fi rst, signs are composed of relations, not only between the three aspects of the 
sign  – the object, the representamen, and the interpretant  – but also the fact that 
signifi cation itself is a ‘standing for’ relation. Relations are not things. Th e semiotic 
object may be a material thing, but it can also be an immaterial idea. Signifi cation 
works, and is causally effi  cacious, absolutely regardless of this distinction. Th us, 
semiotics also erases the materialist/idealist opposition. Th ere must be mate-
rial bearers for signifi cation – codes and channels – but sign relations, themselves, 
indeed like all relations as such, are immaterial. Th is is why semiosis, and subjectiv-
ity generally, has been such a problem for a science committed to materialism with-
out exception. Everyone now talks about ‘information’, and codes and channels, but 
such talk cannot talk about semantics, or meanings. Scientists like to measure things, 
but try measuring relation, meaning or all possible dimensions and extensions of 
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function. [See, for an example of this impossibility, Stuart Kauff man’s (2013) discus-
sion of the ‘adjacent possible’ in his Foreword, “Evolution beyond Newton, Darwin 
and entailing law”, to Henning and Scarfe (eds.), Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life 
Back into Biology.] It can’t be done. I think that materialism is better understood as a 
form of necessary carrying of semiosis, so that objects which are also material things 
(which they needn’t be, of course; objects can also be ideas) are equally understood 
as potential bearers of meaning. Matter, it seems to me, can usefully be thought of as 
a potential bearer of information, and living matter as a potential bearer of semiosis. 
Inform-ing the non-living and the living turn out to be diff erent things. Th e former 
is infl exible – what Charles Peirce called ‘eff ete mind’ – whilst the latter is capable of 
self-organized responsiveness, especially of a very creative kind in relation to chance 
events. 
Some of you will recognise in this a sort of biosemiotic confraternity with the 
new materialism and object-orientated ontologies. All semiotic objects (whether 
thing or idea indiff erently) are real objects and causally effi  cacious. Such semiotic 
objects can develop and grow; both things, in other words, and ideas can gener-
ate more knowledge and more meaning. Th is is the business of art and of science. 
Peirce, himself, wrote that “every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that 
is no mere fi gure of speech. Th e body of the symbol changes slowly, but its mean-
ing inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off  old ones” (EP 2:264). 
Meanings evolve. But the meanings which belong to non-living objects are not their 
own; they belong to the living organisms who make them. Th e meanings that belong 
to all living things grow and evolve themselves also. Th ey do this via the movement 
of similarity and diff erence, expressed in the play of habit (or repetition) and chance, 
linked in chains of association thus establishing new habits to be creatively disrupted 
by chance and new diff erences. Th is is, itself, a description of what humans call met-
aphor, metonymy and synecdoche, so when I use the word metaphor, I am not using 
it metaphorically.
Each organism lives in its own creaturely umwelt. But on top of that species 
umwelt of signs and meanings, any creature with culture most surely inhabits a 
world of meanings which are made by the historical time, temporalities, and geo-
graphical place of each culture. Here, we can think about another thing associated 
with an evolutionary view. Th is is that evolution expressed in natural metaphor and 
metonymy is, at the same time, building strata of development; each layer is trigger-
ing, supporting and scaff olding the evolution and thus semiosic complexity of the 
next, none simply reducible to what was fi rst laid down. Th e concept of emergence 
was coined to address this non-reducible dynamic of evolutionary adaptive systems. 
Nothing comes from nothing. Th ere will always be semiosic threads making the 
future from the past. And this should remind us that we cannot assume that either a 
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plant or an idea which grows benignly in one place and culture will grow benignly in 
another. 
Jesper Hoff meyer’s theory of semiotic scaff olding captures this structuration of 
developmental and evolutionary levels. He writes:
the human genome cannot be considered a “master plan” or controller of human 
development. […] the genome is better understood as a semiotically controlled 
scaff olding system. However, as a scaff olding system, the genome is only the most 
basic form; multiple semiotic scaff oldings of a more and more overriding range 
are built on the top of the genetic scaff olding system, and most important in the 
context of cultural psychology, semiotic scaff olding systems painlessly bridge the 
mind-body gap, being in their function as controllers, essentially somatic and 
social, in one and the same process. (Hoff meyer 2014: 95–6)
3. The biosemiotic idea of poiesis
In my fi nal section I now want to look at the role played by chance in a necessarily 
habit-run, but not deterministic, world. Th e growing of meaning from chance, from 
the semiosic apprehension of patterns of similarity and diff erence, runs through-
out the living world. It is a major motor of learning and adaptive change. But since 
we humans, at least in the West, have largely abandoned the kinds of languages, 
practices and understandings which make room for a creative and non-calculative 
response to the unexpected, for chance and the abductive attitude, and have instead 
replaced it with a dependence upon the will and upon control rather than respon-
siveness, chance as fruitfulness has been associated mainly with artists. 
I want to end with a brief consideration of creative practice, and of poets in par-
ticular, because I think this tells us something signifi cant about the conduct of life 
in general, not just for artists and inventors, and the limits of the will as a source of 
creativity, adaptation, and evolution more generally. 
My fi rst example of the chance encounter off ered as renewal is Th omas Hardy’s 
“Th e darkling thrush”, fi rst published at Christmas 1899. Th e story the poem tells is 
of the poet’s chance wintry meeting with the ‘aged’ thrush, which was, nonetheless, 
surprisingly capable of a Christmas birth of newness in its carolling in of the New 
Year and the new twentieth century. 
We might say that the thrush, and what it can mean, is a chance aff ordance 
(Pickering 20072). It provides a kind of scaff olding for Hardy which can make a 
bridge into the future. Peirce called this aspect of evolutionary life tychism, aft er 
2 Pickering, John 2007. Aff ordances are signs. triple C 5(2): 64–74 can be accessed at http://
www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/viewFile/59/61.
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tyché, the Greek for chance. Th is creative use of chance, by the individual, but neces-
sarily drawn from and working for the community of being of which the individual 
is a part, is characteristic of the play between habit and chance event which makes 
all evolutionary life, biological and cultural, possible. Peirce called this principle of 
connectedness, in this reminiscent of A. N. Whitehead, agapism. It links every evo-
lutionary event in the universe in a play of semiosic patterns and exchange. Martin 
Heidegger called this relatedness “the mirror play of the simple one fold of earth 
and sky, divinities and mortals” (Heidegger 1975a: 179). In our own modern period, 
Heidegger thought that this interrelatedness of things, a proper thinking about being 
as relation, had been forgotten – except by the poets (Heidegger 1975b: 91–142).
Th e poet’s job is the use of habit as formal constraint, as carrying vehicle, for the 
unsettling of habit by diff erence. Poetic form and biological form stand in a homolo-
gous relation; it is the regularity of form (or habit) which makes creative evolution 
possible as formal disruption aff ording the possibility of new meanings (or func-
tions). Th is unsettling of habit has a processual temporal dimension also. Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s argument that the past in memory is essentially creative and 
constructive in the present is another exemplary case of nonlinear looping semiotic 
causation (Barfi eld 1971). A similar idea is expressed by T. S. Eliot (1997[1920]) in 
“Tradition and the individual talent”, where the new poetic voice rearranges our 
understanding of the poetic voices of the past, and also by the idea of downward 
causation in biology where subsequent developments rearrange or alter anteced-
ent ones. To use Stuart Kauff man’s (2003: 1–24) example, what was simply a “fi sh 
jawbone” becomes understood as “mammalian ear”. A jawbone, it turns out, was 
always an ear in waiting; what was once just for the digestion of food becomes a 
matter for the digestion of diff erent kinds of nourishment: a voice, a tune – or even 
a lecture. 
To be overwhelmed by habit, and to fail to see that both nature and culture are 
lived as acts of something like imaginative mind, creatively open to chance, is to be 
too caught in that degraded form of imagination that Coleridge calls ‘Fancy’. Th is is, 
he says, “the lethargy of custom” and “the fi lm of familiarity and selfi sh solicitude” 
(Coleridge 1817: ch XIV). As Owen Barfi eld writes in What Coleridge Th ought, in 
this condition “the mind is in thrall to the lethargy of custom, when it feeds solely 
on images which itself has taken no part in producing” (Barfi eld 1971: 87; Coleridge 
1817). Here, too, creativity (‘Imagination’ proper, brought forth in the biosemi-
otic work of the self) is recognized as the necessary counterpart to necessary habit 
(‘Fancy’ as conventional imagining).3 It’s also worth noticing that, for Coleridge 
3 Clearly, all imaginative creation is dependent upon what has gone before. Th e distinction 
which Coleridge is making, and I am endorsing, which is clarifi ed further in the quote from 
“Dejection: An ode” below, is that genuine creativity consists in making a new life out of the 
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also, properly creative being is fundamentally relational and productive. As Barfi eld, 
quoting Coleridge, writes: “imagination is, and fancy is not, “the very power of 
growth and production”’ (Coleridge 1817 quoted in Barfi eld 1971: 88). 
Returning to Hardy’s poem, we can note the parallels in the way the poet’s new 
insight draws upon antecedent articulations. Th e Christian imagery of the midwin-
ter birth of hope is there, of course, but so too are its earlier pagan hisses: tree wor-
ship and animism, the whispers and clicks of wind, water and earth meeting. Th e 
poem is full of sibilant sounds meeting the resistant consonants of soil and stone; it 
must have been raining or sleeting when Hardy was out walking that day. Th ese take 
the ‘auditory imagination’ of both writer and reader back to the fabric of much ear-
lier biosemiotic scaff oldings. Here is Eliot’s famous formulation:
What I call the “auditory imagination” is the feeling for syllable and rhythm, pen-
etrating far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling invigorating every 
word; sinking to the most primitive and forgotten, returning to the origin and 
bringing something back, seeking the beginning and the end. It works through 
meanings, certainly, or not without meanings in the ordinary sense, and fuses the 
old and obliterated and the trite, the current, and the new and surprising, the most 
ancient and the most civilised mentality. (Eliot 1964[1933]: 118)4
Seamus Heaney’s essay “Englands of the mind” uses Eliot’s insight in order to explore 
what Heaney calls the “deposits in the descending storeys of the literary and histori-
cal past” (Heaney 2003: 77–78). His examples come from the poetry of Ted Hughes, 
Geoff rey Hill, and Philip Larkin. Th ere, “Hughes’s is a primeval landscape where 
stones cry out and horizons endure, where the elements inhabit the mind with a reli-
gious force, where the pebble dreams ‘it is the foetus of God’” (Heaney 2003: 78). 
Hill’s poems, on the other hand, bear the mark of the Norman invasion: “His elegies 
are not laments for the irrevocable dispersal of the comitatus and the ring-giver in 
the hall, but solemn requiems for Plantagenet kings […]” (Heaney 2003: 79). Larkin, 
nearer to the surface of the present, speaks in a language where “trees and fl owers 
and grasses are neither animistic, nor hallowed by half remembered druidic lore; 
they are the emblems of mutability. Behind them lies the sensibility of troubadour 
and courtier” (Heaney 2003: 79).
But we can reach deeper still: A. E. Housman (1986[1955]: 144) notes that 
“poetry indeed seems to me more physical than intellectual’. And, going even deeper 
into the cellars and foundations of the biosemiotic self, D. H. Lawrence, writing on 
past, not in mere derivative imitation. Resemblance and repetition or habit (metaphor’s initial 
move) are inevitable; it is the tiny bit of diff erence (metaphor’s “second move” so to speak) that 
counts.
4 D. H. Lawrence (1985) was extremely alert to this aspect of Hardy’s writing.
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feelings (not emotions) expressed in the writing and reading of the novel, especially 
in its characters, suggests that
man is the only creature who has deliberately tried to tame himself.
.  . . [but]
Now we have to return. Now again the old Adam must lift  up his face and his 
breast, and untame himself… In the very darkest continent of the body, there is God. 
And from Him issues the fi rst dark rays of our feeling, wordless and utterly previous 
to words; the innermost rays, the fi rst messengers, the primeval, honourable beasts 
of our being, whose voice echoes wordless and forever wordless down the darkest 
avenues of the soul, but full of potent speech. Our own inner meaning.
Now we have to educate ourselves …by listening. Not by listening in to noises 
from Chicago to Timbuctoo. But listening-in to the voices of the honourable 
beasts that call in the dark paths of the veins of our body, from the God in the 
heart. Listening inwards, inwards, not for words nor for inspiration, but to the 
lowing of the innermost beasts, the feelings, that roam in the forest of the blood, 
from the feet of God within the red, dark heart. (Lawrence 1985: 203–5)
           
Finally, when we want to think about proper living thought coming in, we can turn 
for an example to Hughes’ well-known poem “Th e thought fox” which describes the 
process as a kind of abductive animal canniness. Th e poem starts with loneliness and 
silence, a starless midnight forest, a ticking clock, and the poet’s blank page. Beyond 
the consonants of earth and forest “hacking and hedging and hammering down”, 
there comes, “fl uid and vowelling and sibilant” (Heaney 2003: 81), that shockingly 
urgent “something else is alive”:
I imagine this midnight moment’s forest: 
Something else is alive 
Beside the clock’s loneliness 
And this blank page where my fi ngers move. 
But then comes the quickening:
Th rough the window I see no star: 
Something more near 
Th ough deeper within darkness 
Is entering the loneliness: 
            . . . 
Till with a sudden sharp stink of fox
It enters the dark hole of the head.
Th e window is starless still; the clock ticks,
Th e page is printed.
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Th e poetic voice is made in the magical den of the mind where animal meaning 
lives. Th e middle stanzas tell us something about the nature of the thought fox:
Cold, delicately as the dark snow,
A fox’s nose touches twig, leaf;
Two eyes serve a movement, that now
And again now, and now, and now
Sets neat prints into the snow
Between trees, and warily a lame
Shadow lags by stump and in hollow
Of a body that is bold to come
Across clearings, an eye,
A widening deepening greenness,
Brilliantly, concentratedly,
Coming about its own business
We can see that this is a creature of poiesis, constantly on the lookout for signs, a 
maker of meanings. But also, Hughes’s anima is, as with the lively source of so many 
inventions – perhaps particularly aesthetic ones – a creature of chance – a wily and 
opportunistic fox. Nothing must be approached directly, or willed. 
Th ere is no meaning in the chance event itself; meaning is made from the cease-
less play of a mind that is a connoisseur of magical coincidence, and determined to 
make something out of it. Supposedly modern, rational and scientifi cally educated 
people oft en ask, with great frustration, why so many people remain superstitious 
and engaged in magical thinking. Th e right answer is not because they are stupid 
or insuffi  ciently educated in the ways of science; it is because that, mysteriously and 
magically, is how the human mind works. It is capable of taking what seems to be a 
small hint or clue, and of building from it, via the mind’s vast web of connections, an 
hypothesis about what this new thing might mean, about what it should be associ-
ated with, and about what its implications might be.
Th e necessary structure of the sign, regardless of there being any minds in actual 
existence, describes the structure necessary to any mind also. In other words, mind 
is a sign. It is open, unfi nished, and capable of growth. Or perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that mind is as many potential billions of sign relations as there are 
grains of sand in the whole wide world.
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